Fourth Generation War against Evo | La Guerra de Cuarta Generación contra Evo

This article has been translated to English using Google translator. The original version in Spanish follows. – admin

Fourth Generation War against Evo

La epoca

2011-10-04
by: Hugo Moldiz Mercado

One strategy that has media and social networking instruments of execution, has sought since 2006 to build social collective imaginations and sensibilities contrary to the process of change and to wear the leadership of President Evo Morales at the prospect of violent overthrow or political and electoral defeat. Taking advantage of unwarranted repression of indigenous September 24, the Fourth Generation War again showed his face.

The September 24th afternoon, a violent police intervention in the indigenous march Yucumo, opened up to unleash a variant while a new phase of Fourth Generation War against the government of President Evo Morales, who the national and international law has been proposed to defeat, as with other similar processes in Latin America.

And this Fourth Generation war is the dispute of the senses from the apprehension of objective reality to subjective unstructured and then set up another reality, radically different, but that our senses observe and feel it as true.

The media construction of a false reality of a fact left real: the repression that about five hundred police against indigenous developed since August 15 began a march to the seat of national government to demand prior consultation by the intention of building a road from Villa Tunari (Cochabamba) and San Ignacio de Moxos (Beni).

The violence of the soldiers there. There’s no doubt. But this gross error of the government policy was accompanied by the dissemination of news that amplified the extent of repression and, therefore, caused quite violent emotional reactions against the first indigenous president of Bolivia and Latin America, which coincided, deliberately or not- with the construction of a matrix of opinion that the national and international law is responsible for activating several months ago: “Evo, enemy of the Indians.”

The front-page headlines and news agencies, print media and national and international information as well as repeated images of repression permanently TV networks spoke of the death of a baby and other adults as well as the disappearance of several indigenous. Some said he had died three, seven and was not mentioned that the figure had increased to nine. It is evident that there were no casualties.

The wide dissemination of this news, never tested or exposed by the media on the nature of “alleged” or “transcended” but rather presented in a way that left no room for doubt, created an atmosphere of social rejection as adopted by the government, even in broad sectors of society committed to the process of change.

The media hype was not the same when a group of Indians held by the space of an hour over Chancellor David Choquehuanca, who was forced to march as a sort of shield to break the police cordon that separated the indigenous cultural communities to reject some items in the list of the Central Peoples of Eastern Bolivia (CIDOB). Most of the media have not been worked hard to emphasize the proposal prior consultation and installation of working groups that the government proposed on September 13 through the head of the Foreign Policy of the multinational state.

A leisurely look at the origins and behavior of the media leads us to think that some gross errors incurred in such information for negligence, but that others did as part of a sustained communications policy since Evo Morales took over the leadership of the country January 2006. However, even those not “misled” intentionally, it is obvious that became part of a new era of Fourth Generation War that has raged for nearly 6 years against the Indian government and the process of change.

In fact, in about a year and a half of the second mandate of President Morales, is about five matrices of opinion that have been built systematically “enemy of indigenous Evo”, “Evo, enemy of Mother Earth” “Evo, permissible activities of drug trafficking”, “Evo, a friend of terrorist governments” and “Evo, totalitarian and authoritarian.”

These matrices of opinion, easily traceable and identifiable in the media, as well as Social Networking has been joined in recent days, from Sunday 24 September, the strong charge of “Evo, massacre,” he which constitutes a very favorable scenario for the imperial strategy designed for the Indian leader’s second term: the strategy of attrition to defeat political and institutional change process and Evo Morales, the highest conductor.

Moreover, this subversive strategy materialized through the media war was also part of the components of the strategy for the overthrow by undemocratic methods that triggered national and international law in the period 2006-2009, with a maximum peak occurred between August -October 2008, when paramilitary groups were taking repressed state facilities and authorities and militants of the change process, and the attempt to divide the country and assassinate Evo Morales.

This active role of the media apparatus has been strengthened in Bolivia almost similar to that recorded in other Latin American countries where the right has no political parties and leaders with roots in society, so many scholars agree that in the media communication are part of “unofficial” political system.

Therefore, The Fourth Generation War serves to advance several objectives: systematic wear governments and political leaders, the induction of partial forms of violence against governments, the overthrow of the revolutionary process of change or non-democratic means and preparation objective and subjective conditions internal to foreign military intervention, the most important.

One of the cornerstones of this type of war is “winning the hearts and minds of people”, as defined by the general Summers, one of the ideologists of the so-called low intensity warfare and whose difference from the classic doctrine of Homeland Security is that the objective is not primarily the physical elimination of opponents, but especially the disappearance of the social base that makes possible the emergence and development of projects and political leaders opposed to U.S. interests and capital.

If one takes into account the above, you will find enough to identify which elements to President Morales has sought to specify whether construction of subjective conditions for his overthrow by undemocratic means and political wear an electoral defeat. Most of the media legitimized paramilitary violence in the first term of the change and now de-legitimize the right of the state’s monopoly on the use of force. Sure, the latter do so on the basis of the gross political errors as committed against the indigenous march.

In the plans of the more conservative right-wing sectors of the country not ruled out the division of the country to encourage foreign military intervention as an “appeasement” and is now threatening Latin America undisguised enthusiasm of some Obama advisers to use the “Libyan model” in other parts of the world.

Moreover, there is no doubt that the Fourth Generation Warfare is found in young people, to whom it is easier to manipulate by a series of objective conditions, the most important social force for the deployment of this strategy and that is fertile ground not both their greater identification with social networking but by the political neglect of which are subject to change part of the process.

La Guerra de Cuarta Generación contra Evo

2011-10-04

por: Hugo Moldiz Mercado

Una estrategia que tiene en los medios de comunicación y las redes

sociales sus instrumentos de ejecución, ha buscado desde 2006

construir imaginarios colectivos y sensibilidades sociales contrarios

al proceso de cambio y para desgastar el liderazgo del presidente Evo

Morales en la perspectiva de su derrocamiento violento o su derrota

político-electoral. Aprovechando la injustificada represión a los

indígenas el 24 de septiembre, esta Guerra de Cuarta Generación volvió

a mostrar la cara.

El 24 de septiembre en la tarde, una violenta intervención policial a

la marcha indígena en Yucumo, abrió pasó para que se desatara una

variante y al mismo tiempo una nueva fase de La Guerra de Cuarta

Generación contra el gobierno del presidente Evo Morales, a quien la

derecha nacional e internacional se ha propuesto derrotar, como ocurre

con otros procesos similares en América Latina.

Y esta Guerra de Cuarta Generación es la disputa de sentidos a partir

de la aprehensión de la realidad objetiva para subjetivamente

desestructurarla y luego armar otra realidad, radicalmente diferente,

pero que nuestros sentidos la observan y la sienten como verdad.

La construcción mediática de una realidad falseada partió de un hecho

real: la represión que cerca de medio millar de policías desarrolló

contra los indígenas que desde el 15 de agosto comenzaron una marcha

hacia la sede del gobierno nacional en demanda de la consulta previa

por la intención de construir una carretera entre Villa Tunari

(Cochabamba) y San Ignacio de Moxos (Beni).

La violencia de los uniformados existió. De eso no hay la menor duda.

Pero este grueso error político del gobierno fue acompañado de la

difusión de noticias que amplificaban el alcance de la represión y,

por tanto, provocaban reacciones emocionales bastante violentas contra

el primer presidente indígena de Bolivia y América Latina, lo cual

coincidía —premeditadamente o no— con la construcción de una matriz de

opinión que la derecha nacional e internacional se ha encargado de

activar hace varios meses: “Evo, enemigo de los indígenas”.

Los titulares de portada y de las noticias de medios impresos y

agencias nacionales e internacionales de información, así como las

imágenes de la represión reiteradas permanentemente por las redes de

televisión hablaban de la muerte de un bebé y de otros adultos, así

como la desaparición de varios indígenas. Unos decían que habían

fallecido tres, otros siete y no se dejó de mencionar que la cifra

llegaba a nueve. Lo evidente es que no se registraron bajas.

La amplia difusión de estas noticias, jamás comprobadas por los medios

ni expuestas bajo la naturaleza de “presuntas” o “trascendidos”, sino

más bien presentadas de tal manera que no dejaba espacio para la duda,

generó un ambiente de rechazo social a la medida adoptada por el

gobierno, incluso en amplios sectores sociales comprometidos con el

proceso de cambio.

Este despliegue mediático no fue el mismo cuando un grupo de indígenas

retuvo por el espacio de más de una hora al Canciller David

Choquehuanca, quien fue obligado a marchar como una suerte de escudo

para romper el cerco policial que separaba a los indígenas de las

comunidades interculturales que rechazan algunos puntos del pliego de

la Central de Pueblos Indígenas del Oriente Boliviano (CIDOB). La

mayor parte de los medios tampoco se han esforzado mucho por hacer

énfasis en la propuesta de Consulta Previa y la instalación de mesas

de trabajo que el gobierno propuso el 13 de septiembre a través del

responsable de la Política Exterior del Estado plurinacional.

Una mirada pausada a los orígenes y comportamiento de los medios de

comunicación conduce a pensar que unos incurrieron en esos gruesos

errores informativos por negligencia, pero que otros lo hicieron en el

marco de una política comunicacional sostenida desde que Evo Morales

asumió la conducción del país en enero de 2006. Sin embargo, aún los

que no “desinformaron” intencionalmente, es evidente que llegaron a

formar parte de una nueva etapa de La Guerra de Cuarta Generación que

se ha desatado durante casi de 6 años contra el gobierno indígena y el

proceso de cambio.

De hecho, en cerca de un año y medio de este segundo mandato del

presidente Morales, hay cerca de cinco matrices de opinión que

sistemáticamente se han ido construyendo: “Evo enemigo de los

indígenas”, “Evo, enemigo de la Madre Tierra”, “Evo, permisible con

las actividades del narcotráfico”, “Evo, amigo de los gobiernos

terroristas” y “Evo, totalitario y autoritario”.

A estas matrices de opinión, fácilmente rastreables e identificables

en los medios de comunicación, así como en las Redes Sociales, se ha

sumado en los últimos días, a partir del domingo 24 de septiembre, la

fuerte acusación de “Evo, masacrador”, lo cual configura un escenario

bastante favorable para la estrategia imperial diseñada para este

segundo mandato del líder indígena: la estrategia del desgaste para la

derrota político-institucional del proceso de cambio y de Evo Morales,

su máximo conductor.

Es más, esta estrategia subversiva materializada a través de la guerra

mediática también formó parte de los componentes de la estrategia para

el derrocamiento mediante métodos no democráticos que la derecha

nacional e internacional activó en el periodo 2006-2009, cuyo máximo

pico se dio entre agosto-octubre de 2008, cuando grupos paramilitares

tomaban instalaciones estatales y reprimían a autoridades y militantes

del proceso de cambio, así como el intento de dividir el país y

asesinar a Evo Morales.

Este activo papel del aparato mediático se ha ido fortaleciendo en

Bolivia casi de manera similar a la registrada en otros países de

América Latina donde la derecha carece de partidos políticos y líderes

con arraigo social, por lo que no pocos estudiosos coinciden que en

los medios de comunicación forman parte “no oficial” del sistema

político.

Por tanto, La Guerra de Cuarta Generación sirve para avanzar hacia

varios objetivos: el desgaste sistemáticos de gobiernos y líderes

políticos, el desencadenamiento de formas parciales de violencia

contra los gobiernos, el derrocamiento de procesos revolucionarios o

de cambio por medios no democráticos y la preparación de condiciones

objetivas y subjetivas internas para una intervención militar

extranjera, entre los más importantes.

Uno de los ejes centrales de este tipo de guerra es “conquistar los

corazones y las mentes de la gente”, como bien lo definiera el general

Summers, uno de los ideólogos de la denominada Guerra de Baja

Intensidad y cuya diferencia con la clásica Doctrina de Seguridad

Nacional es que el objetivo no es principalmente la eliminación física

del adversario, sino sobre todo la desaparición de la base social que

hace posible el surgimiento y el desarrollo de proyectos y liderazgos

políticos contrarios a los intereses de Estados Unidos y el capital.

Si uno toma en cuenta lo anteriormente señalado, encontrará bastantes

elementos como para identificar que ante el presidente Morales se ha

buscado concretar ya sea construcción de condiciones subjetivas para

su derrocamiento por medios no democráticos y su desgaste político

para una derrota electoral. La mayor parte de los medios de

comunicación legitimaron la violencia paramilitar en el primer mandato

del gobierno de cambio y ahora deslegitiman el derecho del estado al

uso del monopolio de la fuerza. Claro, esto último lo hacen sobre la

base de los gruesos errores políticos como el cometido contra la

marcha indígena.

En los planes de los sectores de derecha más conservadores del país

tampoco se descartó la división del país para alentar la intervención

militar extranjera a título de “pacificación” y que ahora es una

amenaza para América Latina por el entusiasmo no disimulado de algunos

consejeros de Obama para utilizar el “modelo libio” en otras partes

del mundo.

Por lo demás, no hay duda que La Guerra de Cuarta Generación está

encontrando en los jóvenes, a quienes es más fácil manipular por una

serie de condiciones objetivas, a la fuerza social más importante para

el despliegue de esta estrategia y que encuentra terreno fértil no

tanto por su mayor identificación con las Redes Sociales sino por el

abandono político del que son objeto de parte del proceso de cambio.

http://www.la-epoca.com.bo/index.php?opt=front&mod=detalle&id=932

Fourth Generation War against Evo | La Guerra de Cuarta Generación contra Evo

We are in the process of having the Spanish commentary translated properly. In the meantime, the following article has been translated to English using Google translator. We apologize for the inconvenience. The original version in Spanish follows. -admin

Fourth Generation War against Evo

La epoca

2011-10-04
by: Hugo Moldiz Mercado

One strategy that has media and social networking instruments of execution, has sought since 2006 to build social collective imaginations and sensibilities contrary to the process of change and to wear the leadership of President Evo Morales at the prospect of violent overthrow or political and electoral defeat. Taking advantage of unwarranted repression of indigenous September 24, the Fourth Generation War again showed his face.

The September 24th afternoon, a violent police intervention in the indigenous march Yucumo, opened up to unleash a variant while a new phase of Fourth Generation War against the government of President Evo Morales, who the national and international law has been proposed to defeat, as with other similar processes in Latin America.

And this Fourth Generation war is the dispute of the senses from the apprehension of objective reality to subjective unstructured and then set up another reality, radically different, but that our senses observe and feel it as true.

The media construction of a false reality of a fact left real: the repression that about five hundred police against indigenous developed since August 15 began a march to the seat of national government to demand prior consultation by the intention of building a road from Villa Tunari (Cochabamba) and San Ignacio de Moxos (Beni).

The violence of the soldiers there. There’s no doubt. But this gross error of the government policy was accompanied by the dissemination of news that amplified the extent of repression and, therefore, caused quite violent emotional reactions against the first indigenous president of Bolivia and Latin America, which coincided, deliberately or not- with the construction of a matrix of opinion that the national and international law is responsible for activating several months ago: “Evo, enemy of the Indians.”

The front-page headlines and news agencies, print media and national and international information as well as repeated images of repression permanently TV networks spoke of the death of a baby and other adults as well as the disappearance of several indigenous. Some said he had died three, seven and was not mentioned that the figure had increased to nine. It is evident that there were no casualties.

The wide dissemination of this news, never tested or exposed by the media on the nature of “alleged” or “transcended” but rather presented in a way that left no room for doubt, created an atmosphere of social rejection as adopted by the government, even in broad sectors of society committed to the process of change.

The media hype was not the same when a group of Indians held by the space of an hour over Chancellor David Choquehuanca, who was forced to march as a sort of shield to break the police cordon that separated the indigenous cultural communities to reject some items in the list of the Central Peoples of Eastern Bolivia (CIDOB). Most of the media have not been worked hard to emphasize the proposal prior consultation and installation of working groups that the government proposed on September 13 through the head of the Foreign Policy of the multinational state.

A leisurely look at the origins and behavior of the media leads us to think that some gross errors incurred in such information for negligence, but that others did as part of a sustained communications policy since Evo Morales took over the leadership of the country January 2006. However, even those not “misled” intentionally, it is obvious that became part of a new era of Fourth Generation War that has raged for nearly 6 years against the Indian government and the process of change.

In fact, in about a year and a half of the second mandate of President Morales, is about five matrices of opinion that have been built systematically “enemy of indigenous Evo”, “Evo, enemy of Mother Earth” “Evo, permissible activities of drug trafficking”, “Evo, a friend of terrorist governments” and “Evo, totalitarian and authoritarian.”

These matrices of opinion, easily traceable and identifiable in the media, as well as Social Networking has been joined in recent days, from Sunday 24 September, the strong charge of “Evo, massacre,” he which constitutes a very favorable scenario for the imperial strategy designed for the Indian leader’s second term: the strategy of attrition to defeat political and institutional change process and Evo Morales, the highest conductor.

Moreover, this subversive strategy materialized through the media war was also part of the components of the strategy for the overthrow by undemocratic methods that triggered national and international law in the period 2006-2009, with a maximum peak occurred between August -October 2008, when paramilitary groups were taking repressed state facilities and authorities and militants of the change process, and the attempt to divide the country and assassinate Evo Morales.

This active role of the media apparatus has been strengthened in Bolivia almost similar to that recorded in other Latin American countries where the right has no political parties and leaders with roots in society, so many scholars agree that in the media communication are part of “unofficial” political system.

Therefore, The Fourth Generation War serves to advance several objectives: systematic wear governments and political leaders, the induction of partial forms of violence against governments, the overthrow of the revolutionary process of change or non-democratic means and preparation objective and subjective conditions internal to foreign military intervention, the most important.

One of the cornerstones of this type of war is “winning the hearts and minds of people”, as defined by the general Summers, one of the ideologists of the so-called low intensity warfare and whose difference from the classic doctrine of Homeland Security is that the objective is not primarily the physical elimination of opponents, but especially the disappearance of the social base that makes possible the emergence and development of projects and political leaders opposed to U.S. interests and capital.

If one takes into account the above, you will find enough to identify which elements to President Morales has sought to specify whether construction of subjective conditions for his overthrow by undemocratic means and political wear an electoral defeat. Most of the media legitimized paramilitary violence in the first term of the change and now de-legitimize the right of the state’s monopoly on the use of force. Sure, the latter do so on the basis of the gross political errors as committed against the indigenous march.

In the plans of the more conservative right-wing sectors of the country not ruled out the division of the country to encourage foreign military intervention as an “appeasement” and is now threatening Latin America undisguised enthusiasm of some Obama advisers to use the “Libyan model” in other parts of the world.

Moreover, there is no doubt that the Fourth Generation Warfare is found in young people, to whom it is easier to manipulate by a series of objective conditions, the most important social force for the deployment of this strategy and that is fertile ground not both their greater identification with social networking but by the political neglect of which are subject to change part of the process.

La Guerra de Cuarta Generación contra Evo

2011-10-04

por: Hugo Moldiz Mercado

Una estrategia que tiene en los medios de comunicación y las redes

sociales sus instrumentos de ejecución, ha buscado desde 2006

construir imaginarios colectivos y sensibilidades sociales contrarios

al proceso de cambio y para desgastar el liderazgo del presidente Evo

Morales en la perspectiva de su derrocamiento violento o su derrota

político-electoral. Aprovechando la injustificada represión a los

indígenas el 24 de septiembre, esta Guerra de Cuarta Generación volvió

a mostrar la cara.

El 24 de septiembre en la tarde, una violenta intervención policial a

la marcha indígena en Yucumo, abrió pasó para que se desatara una

variante y al mismo tiempo una nueva fase de La Guerra de Cuarta

Generación contra el gobierno del presidente Evo Morales, a quien la

derecha nacional e internacional se ha propuesto derrotar, como ocurre

con otros procesos similares en América Latina.

Y esta Guerra de Cuarta Generación es la disputa de sentidos a partir

de la aprehensión de la realidad objetiva para subjetivamente

desestructurarla y luego armar otra realidad, radicalmente diferente,

pero que nuestros sentidos la observan y la sienten como verdad.

La construcción mediática de una realidad falseada partió de un hecho

real: la represión que cerca de medio millar de policías desarrolló

contra los indígenas que desde el 15 de agosto comenzaron una marcha

hacia la sede del gobierno nacional en demanda de la consulta previa

por la intención de construir una carretera entre Villa Tunari

(Cochabamba) y San Ignacio de Moxos (Beni).

La violencia de los uniformados existió. De eso no hay la menor duda.

Pero este grueso error político del gobierno fue acompañado de la

difusión de noticias que amplificaban el alcance de la represión y,

por tanto, provocaban reacciones emocionales bastante violentas contra

el primer presidente indígena de Bolivia y América Latina, lo cual

coincidía —premeditadamente o no— con la construcción de una matriz de

opinión que la derecha nacional e internacional se ha encargado de

activar hace varios meses: “Evo, enemigo de los indígenas”.

Los titulares de portada y de las noticias de medios impresos y

agencias nacionales e internacionales de información, así como las

imágenes de la represión reiteradas permanentemente por las redes de

televisión hablaban de la muerte de un bebé y de otros adultos, así

como la desaparición de varios indígenas. Unos decían que habían

fallecido tres, otros siete y no se dejó de mencionar que la cifra

llegaba a nueve. Lo evidente es que no se registraron bajas.

La amplia difusión de estas noticias, jamás comprobadas por los medios

ni expuestas bajo la naturaleza de “presuntas” o “trascendidos”, sino

más bien presentadas de tal manera que no dejaba espacio para la duda,

generó un ambiente de rechazo social a la medida adoptada por el

gobierno, incluso en amplios sectores sociales comprometidos con el

proceso de cambio.

Este despliegue mediático no fue el mismo cuando un grupo de indígenas

retuvo por el espacio de más de una hora al Canciller David

Choquehuanca, quien fue obligado a marchar como una suerte de escudo

para romper el cerco policial que separaba a los indígenas de las

comunidades interculturales que rechazan algunos puntos del pliego de

la Central de Pueblos Indígenas del Oriente Boliviano (CIDOB). La

mayor parte de los medios tampoco se han esforzado mucho por hacer

énfasis en la propuesta de Consulta Previa y la instalación de mesas

de trabajo que el gobierno propuso el 13 de septiembre a través del

responsable de la Política Exterior del Estado plurinacional.

Una mirada pausada a los orígenes y comportamiento de los medios de

comunicación conduce a pensar que unos incurrieron en esos gruesos

errores informativos por negligencia, pero que otros lo hicieron en el

marco de una política comunicacional sostenida desde que Evo Morales

asumió la conducción del país en enero de 2006. Sin embargo, aún los

que no “desinformaron” intencionalmente, es evidente que llegaron a

formar parte de una nueva etapa de La Guerra de Cuarta Generación que

se ha desatado durante casi de 6 años contra el gobierno indígena y el

proceso de cambio.

De hecho, en cerca de un año y medio de este segundo mandato del

presidente Morales, hay cerca de cinco matrices de opinión que

sistemáticamente se han ido construyendo: “Evo enemigo de los

indígenas”, “Evo, enemigo de la Madre Tierra”, “Evo, permisible con

las actividades del narcotráfico”, “Evo, amigo de los gobiernos

terroristas” y “Evo, totalitario y autoritario”.

A estas matrices de opinión, fácilmente rastreables e identificables

en los medios de comunicación, así como en las Redes Sociales, se ha

sumado en los últimos días, a partir del domingo 24 de septiembre, la

fuerte acusación de “Evo, masacrador”, lo cual configura un escenario

bastante favorable para la estrategia imperial diseñada para este

segundo mandato del líder indígena: la estrategia del desgaste para la

derrota político-institucional del proceso de cambio y de Evo Morales,

su máximo conductor.

Es más, esta estrategia subversiva materializada a través de la guerra

mediática también formó parte de los componentes de la estrategia para

el derrocamiento mediante métodos no democráticos que la derecha

nacional e internacional activó en el periodo 2006-2009, cuyo máximo

pico se dio entre agosto-octubre de 2008, cuando grupos paramilitares

tomaban instalaciones estatales y reprimían a autoridades y militantes

del proceso de cambio, así como el intento de dividir el país y

asesinar a Evo Morales.

Este activo papel del aparato mediático se ha ido fortaleciendo en

Bolivia casi de manera similar a la registrada en otros países de

América Latina donde la derecha carece de partidos políticos y líderes

con arraigo social, por lo que no pocos estudiosos coinciden que en

los medios de comunicación forman parte “no oficial” del sistema

político.

Por tanto, La Guerra de Cuarta Generación sirve para avanzar hacia

varios objetivos: el desgaste sistemáticos de gobiernos y líderes

políticos, el desencadenamiento de formas parciales de violencia

contra los gobiernos, el derrocamiento de procesos revolucionarios o

de cambio por medios no democráticos y la preparación de condiciones

objetivas y subjetivas internas para una intervención militar

extranjera, entre los más importantes.

Uno de los ejes centrales de este tipo de guerra es “conquistar los

corazones y las mentes de la gente”, como bien lo definiera el general

Summers, uno de los ideólogos de la denominada Guerra de Baja

Intensidad y cuya diferencia con la clásica Doctrina de Seguridad

Nacional es que el objetivo no es principalmente la eliminación física

del adversario, sino sobre todo la desaparición de la base social que

hace posible el surgimiento y el desarrollo de proyectos y liderazgos

políticos contrarios a los intereses de Estados Unidos y el capital.

Si uno toma en cuenta lo anteriormente señalado, encontrará bastantes

elementos como para identificar que ante el presidente Morales se ha

buscado concretar ya sea construcción de condiciones subjetivas para

su derrocamiento por medios no democráticos y su desgaste político

para una derrota electoral. La mayor parte de los medios de

comunicación legitimaron la violencia paramilitar en el primer mandato

del gobierno de cambio y ahora deslegitiman el derecho del estado al

uso del monopolio de la fuerza. Claro, esto último lo hacen sobre la

base de los gruesos errores políticos como el cometido contra la

marcha indígena.

En los planes de los sectores de derecha más conservadores del país

tampoco se descartó la división del país para alentar la intervención

militar extranjera a título de “pacificación” y que ahora es una

amenaza para América Latina por el entusiasmo no disimulado de algunos

consejeros de Obama para utilizar el “modelo libio” en otras partes

del mundo.

Por lo demás, no hay duda que La Guerra de Cuarta Generación está

encontrando en los jóvenes, a quienes es más fácil manipular por una

serie de condiciones objetivas, a la fuerza social más importante para

el despliegue de esta estrategia y que encuentra terreno fértil no

tanto por su mayor identificación con las Redes Sociales sino por el

abandono político del que son objeto de parte del proceso de cambio.

http://www.la-epoca.com.bo/index.php?opt=front&mod=detalle&id=932

Bolivia: Crisis deepens over disputed highway

Tuesday, September 27, 2011

By Federico Fuentes

September 25 will go down as one of the darkest day in Bolivia since Evo Morales was elected as the country’s first indigenous president almost six years ago.

After more than 40 days of marching, police officers moved in to repress indigenous protesters opposed to the government’s proposed highway that would run through the Isiboro-Secure National Park and Indigenous Territory (TIPNIS).

The controversial highway has been opposed and supported by many of the indigenous and social organisations that make up the support base of the Morales government.

Differences over the project have resulted in tensions escalating between both sides during the past month and particularly in the days leading to the violence. Protesters were set to reach a town were locals were organising a blockade in protest against march demands they felt would negatively impact on them.

After the repression, Morales rejected accusations he was behind events he described as “an abuse committed against our indigenous brothers” and called for an international commission to investigate the incident.

During the police action, which lasted around half an hour, tear gas and rubber bullets sent indigenous marchers, including pregnant women and children, fleeing for safety.

Unconfirmed reports by the media committee of the marchers said one child was killed and that initially several protesters were missing.

A number of march leaders were briefly detained by police, while many more marchers were forced onto buses and sent back home.

Shock and anger at these events led to a wave of mourning and questioning as to how an indigenous-led government could carry out such actions against its own people.

The backdrop to this terrible event is the conflict that has been brewing over months regarding the proposed 306-kilometre highway that would link the departments of Beni and Cochabamba. Currently, the only alternative is the more than 800 kilometre trip that requires first traveling eastwards to the department of Santa Cruz.

Legitimate anger at the failure of the Bolivian government to carry out its obligation in consulting local communities within TIPNIS over the tract of the proposed highway that would cut through their territory, led locals to organise a march onto the capital, La Paz.

By August 15, the march had gained the support of the Confederation of the Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia (CIDOB), which unites the 34 indigenous peoples of Bolivia’s eastern lowlands, and important sections of the National Council of Ayllus and Markas of Qollasuyu, which groups together 16 rural indigenous organisations mainly based in the highlands to the west.

That same day, these organisations presented a list including 15 further demands on the government, with issues ranging from improving indigenous health and education to calls for halting gas exploitation in the Aguaragua National Park and the right of indigenous communities to directly receive funds from the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) program.

REDD is a grossly anti-environmental United Nations program that aims to privatise forests by converting them into “carbon offsets” that allow rich, developed countries to continue polluting.

REDD is also a policy that has been actively pushed by non-government organisations (NGOs) within Bolivia that receive funding from governments in Europe and the United States and have been supporting the march.

The march also garnered unexpected support from a range of right-wing organisations that have campaigned for years to bring down the Morales government. This includes right-wing parties within parliament and organisations such as the Santa Cruz Civic Committee, which spearheaded the September 2008 coup attempt against Morales.

As protesters began to make their way to La Paz, at least nine attempts at dialogue were made by the government to try and resolve the demands of the marchers.

Among the demands that were agreed to by the government, and noted in a document posted on the CIDOB website on September 19, was implementing “the process of consultation with the indigenous communities of TIPNIS involved with section II of the San Ignacio de Moxos — Villa Tunari Highway, as always in compliance with the [constitution], international norms and the participation of observers.”

The government however rejected the possibility of negotiating over the issue of REDD, a policy rejected by the government and participants at the Peoples Summit on Climate Change it hosted in Cochabamba in April 2010.

It also ruled out the possibility of shutting down gas exploitation in Aguaragua National Park as it represents 90% of Bolivia’s gas exports and is fundamental to its ability to fund social programs and industrialise the country’s underdeveloped economy.

Opposition to some of the protesters’ demands also came from other indigenous and campesino groups, such as Bolivia’s largest campesino organisation, the Sole Union Confederation of Bolivian Campesino Workers (CSUTCB).

All up, about 350 organisations have come out in support of the highway.

In Yucumo, a town near the La Paz-Beni border were the march was set to go through, the local affiliate of the “colonisers” union — a term used to refer to indigenous Aymara and Quechua campesinos who migrated to the lowlands in search of land to work — threatened to stop the march unless protesters withdrew five demands they believed would affect them directly.

These included the issue of gas exploitation, disputes over how land reform should proceed, and the protesters’ call to stop the building of two further highways, neither of which were to run through TIPNIS and which local colonisers had been demanding be built.

The tension in Yucumo was palpable, as recorded in one of the press statements issued by the protesters on September 18. In it, a journalist notes the hostile and violent reaction he received when he was surrounded by locals chanting, “the media is biased” and “your trying to make us look bad”.

They were also angered that an interviewer from the same radio as the journalist had referred to the blockaders as coca-growing supporters of Morales party, the Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) — something they denied and demanded he rectify.

With the march advancing on Yucumo, police stopped anti-highway protesters on September 20 in San Miguel de Chaparina, some eight kilometres away, impeding their advance for days in order to avoid confrontations.

Tensions were also visible elsewhere. Reporting on a pro-TIPNIS rally in La Paz, Dario Kenner wrote a September 24 entry on his blog Bolivia Diary that while support for the marchers was clearly visible “not everyone supports the indigenous march… and tensions are running very high”.

Referring to the break out of a fight between opposing forces, Kenner added: “The hostility between groups I witnessed yesterday gives an idea of the polarisation affecting Bolivia at the moment.”

Kenner observed it was evidence of “increasing divisions in the popular movement that mobilised since the Cochabamba Water War in 2000 as the TIPNIS conflict has provoked divisions between and within groups that marched together in the past such as: indigenous social movements, campesino social movements, trade unions, urban social movements, MAS supporters, Bolivian NGOs etc”.

After several days of protesters being held up in San Miguel de Chaparina, indigenous Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca returned for the second time for dialogue with them and Yucumo locals on September 24.

A key focus of discussion was to resolving the impasse between protesters and blockaders.

A September 24 article in La Razon reported on Choquehuanca’s meeting with community leaders in Yucumo. Among them was Rene Huasco, who restated his communities opposition to a number of the marchers demands, adding “it is necessary to bring both sides together in order to explain the points in their list of demands that affect us and find solutions.”

A September 25 article in Pagina Siete on the meeting with the marchers noted that among the options presented by Choquehuanca to calm tensions were continuing dialogue in Quiquibe, on the other side of Yucumo, between committees made up of marchers and blockaders or for the marchers to send a delegation directly to La Paz to dialogue with the government.

According to the same article, “indigenous leaders rejected dialogue with the colonisers” and reiterated their intention to march on La Paz.

Shortly after, as Choquehuanca was about to leave, he was held hostage along with vice-minister Cesar Navarro and police general Edwin Foronda by a group of marchers who proceeded to used them as human shields to break through the police blockade.

With three kilometres to go until reaching Yucumo, the government representatives were released and the march was stopped once again by police barricades.

Choquehuanca told Pagina Siete: “I have been obliged to walk together with the brothers and I have said, we should have resolved this in a different, more peaceful manner based on dialogue.

“We will see if I can help in talking with the intercultural brothers [in Yucumo] and hopefully the climate will not be so tense, so hostile such as when the polices lines were broken.”

Instead tensions rose, with organisations such as the CSUTCB threatening to march on Yucumo.

This was to be expected, as the day before, state news service ABI had reported comments by CSUTCB leader Rodolfo Machaca stating that his organisation had “declares itself in a state of alert and emergency in the face of the imminent politically-motivated mobilisation and convulsion that is being generated in the country … we ask our indigenous brothers to sit down and dialogue”.

Another CSUTCB leader, Simeon Jaliri, noted its support for Choquehuana’s attempt to resolve the situation through dialogue. “Hopefully” nothing will happen to “our brother from the province of Omasuyos, of the Red Ponchos” he said, referring to the legendary militant Aymara grouping in the altiplano, one of the many that Choquehuanca continues to maintain close contact with.

Tensions however boiled over on the afternoon of September 25, when police moved in to break up the protest.

Reporting on the repression, an article published on Erbol that day said that at least 500 police officers participated in the action which left numerous protestors injured, with some reports saying that the number was as high as 40.

Reporting directly on the events, an Erbol journalist said “there is a lot of nervousness among the police and desperation within the marchers.”

Rodrigo Rodriguez from the National Service of Environmental News (SENA) was quoted in the same Erbol article as saying “all the marchers are being repressed, among them women and children who continue to cry, the police say that they are being transported to San Borja. They are also taking away cameras and are not allowing journalists to pass in order to capture images [of the events].”

There have also been reports of clashes between police and blockaders in Yucumo in both state and private media outlets, though little information has been provided. La Prensa reported on September 26 that tear gas was also used there to clear the road.

Confusion and anger seemed to reign the following day, with La Prensa reporting a government minister as stating that the Public Ministry had issued the order for police to move in. However, the prosecutor in the ministry overseeing the investigation into the repression denied the claim in a separate La Prensa article.

Another La Prensa article reported comments by Minister for Communication Ivan Canelas as saying that the government has ordered an investigation as to whether excessive force had been used.

Pagina Siete reported that the general commander of the police Jorge Santiesteban had assured any police officer found to have used excessive force would be punished.

While Erbol reported that a vice-minister for mining had come out against the violence, the Minister of Defence Cecila Chacon issued a public letter of resignation.

She stated that “the measures implemented, far from isolating the right wing, strengthens it ability to act and carry out manipulation within the [march] with the aim of attacking the process of change that has cost the Bolivian people so much.

Finally, on the night of September 26, Morales rejected claims he had ordered the repression and requested that a commission be established involving international organisations, the ombudsman and human rights groups to investigate the violent acts, reported Erbol.

“We lament, we repudiate the excesses carried out against the indigenous march,” Morales said. “I do not agree with (this police action), nor with violence, it was excessive, an abuse committed against our indigenous brothers who were marching.”

He added people to consider “what would have happened if this march passed through and encountered the blockade in Yucumo”.

Morales also announced the suspension of section II of the Villa Tunari — San Ignacio de Moxos highway, and called for a national debate on the issue.

This debate, said Morales, would have to be carried out specifically among the people of Beni and Cochabamba in order for the competing groups to be able to resolve this dispute.

Earlier that day in a visit to some of the communities within TIPNIS that support the highway, Morales also spoke of a referendum on the question involving the population of both departments, though little more detail was given.

Angered by the events of the previous day, at least 5000 people march in La Paz in what Fobomade, a NGO that has been supporting the protest, described in a September 26 article on Bolpress as the biggest mobilisation registered to date in solidarity with the march

Furthermore, on September 26 the vice-president of the mobilisation committee of the march was quoted in La Razon as saying that once they had recuperated their strength and decided their next steps, the march would restart.

Meanwhile, leaders from a group of MAS dissidents who recently left the government called for the struggle for TIPNIS to be convert into a struggle “for our democracy”, as former vice-minister Alejandro Almarez put it.

Another former vice-minister, Raul Prada, wrote that the actions had proven the Morales government to be an “anti-indigenous tyranny” that has “lost all legitimacy”.

Juan del Granado from the Movement of the Fearless, which was previously in an alliance with Morales, was quoted in La Prensa on September 26 as calling the actions “clearly dictatorial.”

At the same time, spokespeople for the Federation of Campesino Workers of La Paz, FSUTCTKLP, insisted on the need for dialogue between indigenous brothers and sisters in order to avoid violence.

Along with calling on CIDOB to once again sit down to negotiate, the government continued on Monday its dialogue with the Assembly of the Guarani People (APG).

The APG had initially participated in the march but requested on September 2 that the government hold direct dialogue talks with them after they decided to abandon the march.

It is too early to tell what will happen next.

The first test will be on Wednesday September 28, the date for which the Bolivian Workers Central (COB) has called a nation-wide general strike. While the COB’s own ability to mobilise is quite debilitated, the protest could become a convergence point for those opposed to the recent actions by the government.

First published at Green Left Weekly

Posted by Bolivia Rising on Tuesday, September 27, 2011 0 comments

Labels: TIPNIS

Bolivia: NGOs wrong on Morales and Amazon

Federico Fuentes

Statements, articles, letters and petitions have been circulating on the internet for the past month calling for an end to the "destruction of the Amazon".

The target of these initiatives has not been transnational corporations or the powerful governments that back them, but the government of Bolivia’s first indigenous president, Evo Morales.

At the centre of the debate is the Bolivian government’s controversial proposal to build a highway through the Isiboro Secure National Park and Indigenous Territory (TIPNIS).

TIPNIS, which covers more than 1 million hectares of forest, was granted indigenous territory status by the Morales government in 2009. About 12,000 people from three different indigenous groups live in 64 communities within TIPNIS.

On August 15, representatives from the TIPNIS Subcentral that unites these communities, as well as other indigenous groups, began a march to the capital city, La Paz to protest against the highway plan.

International petitions have been initiated declaring support for this march, and condemning the Morales government for undermining indigenous rights.

The people of TIPNIS have legitimate concerns about the highway’s impact. There is also no doubt the government has made errors in its handling of the issue.

Unfortunately, petitions such as the one initiated by international lobby group Avaaz and a September 21 letter to Morales signed by over 60 environmental groups mostly outside Bolivia misrepresent the facts and misdirect their fire.

They could inadvertently aid the opponents of the global struggle for climate justice.

Avaaz warns that the highway "could enable foreign companies to pillage the world’s most important forest”. But it fails to mention the destruction that is already happening in the area, in some cases with the complicity of local indigenous communities.

On the other hand, the Morales government has promised to introduce a new law, in consultation with communities within TIPNIS, to add new protections for the national park.

The proposed law would set jail terms of between 10 to 20 years for illegal settlements, growing coca or logging in the national park.

Also, Avaaz claims that "huge economic interests" are motivating Morales’ support for the highway. But Avaaz omits the benefits that such a highway (whether it ultimately goes through TIPNIS or not) will bring Bolivia and its peoples.

For example, this 306 kilometre highway linking the departments of Beni and Cochabamba (with only a part of it going through TIPNIS) would expand access to health care and other basic services to isolated local communities that now travel for days to receive medical care.

The highway would also give local agricultural producers greater access to markets to sell their goods. At the moment, these must go via Santa Cruz to the east before being able to be transported westward.

Given Beni’s status as the largest meat producing department (state), this would break the hold that Santa Cruz-based slaughterhouses have on imposing meat prices.

The highway would also allow the state to assert sovereignty over remote areas, including some where illegal logging takes place.

It is facts such as these that have convinced more than 350 Bolivian organisations, including many of the social organisations that have led the country’s inspiring struggles against neoliberalism, to support the proposed highway.

Many indigenous organisations and communities (including within TIPNIS) support the highway. It is therefore false to describe this as a dispute between the government and indigenous people.

Nor is it a simple conflict between supporters of development and defenders of the environment.

All sides in the dispute want greater development and improved access to basic services. The issue at stake is how the second poorest country in the Americas, facing intense pressure from more powerful governments and corporate forces, can meet the needs of its people while protecting the environment.

Given this, surely it makes more sense for those who wish to defend Bolivia’s process of change to support steps towards dialogue, rather that deepening the divisions.

Legitimate criticism can be made of the government’s handling of the consultation process. But the Avaaz petition and the letter from environmental groups simply ignore the government’s repeated attempts to open discussions with the protesters.

Half the members of Morales’ ministerial cabinet, along with many more vice-ministers and heads of state institutions, have traveled to the march route to talk with protesters.

The petitioners don’t mention the Morales government’s public commitment to carry out a consultation process within the framework of the Bolivian constitution, popularly approved in 2009. Neither do they mention its offer to have the consultation process overseen by international observers selected by protesters themselves.

The government has also remained open to discussing the economic and environmental feasibility of any alternative route that could bypass TIPNIS. No such alternative has been presented yet.

As a result of these initiatives, a number of the TIPNIS communities that had joined the march, as well as representatives from the Assembly of the Guarani People, have since decided to return home. They will continue discussions with the government.

Sadly, the key opponents of the proposed consultation process are among the march leaders, which includes organisations based outside TIPNIS.

These organisations were also the main proponents of a further 15 demands being placed on the government the day the march began.

Many of these demands are legitimate. But it is alarming that some of the more dangerously backwards demands have been ignored or dismissed by international environment groups.

For example, the letter to Morales raises concerns regarding the Bolivian president’s statement that "oil drilling in Aguarague National Park ‘will not be negotiated’".

Those gas fields represent 90% of Bolivia’s gas exports and are a vital source of funds that the Morales government has been using to tackle poverty and develop Bolivia’s economy.

The fact that the bulk of gas revenue is controlled by the Bolivian state rather than transnational corporation is the result of years of struggles by the Bolivian masses, who rightfully believe this resource should be used to develop their country.

The concerns of local communities should be, and have been, taken into consideration. But for Bolivia to cut off this source of revenue would have dire consequences for the people of one of the poorest nations in the Americas.

It would, without exaggeration, be economic suicide.

Initially, protesters also demanded a halt to gas extraction in Aguarague. They have retreated on this and are now focused on the question of plugging up unused oil wells due to the contamination this is could cause to local water supplies.

Similarly, neither of the Internet statements mentions the protesters’ support for the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) program.

REDD is a grossly anti-environmental United Nations program that aims to privatise forests by converting them into “carbon offsets” that allow rich, developed countries to continue polluting.

Some of the biggest proponents of this measure can be found among the NGOs promoting the march. Many of these have received direct funding from the US government, whose ambassador in Bolivia was expelled in September 2008 for supporting a right-wing coup attempt against the elected Morales government.

Rather than defend Bolivia’s sovereignty against US interference, the letter denounces the Bolivian government for exposing connections between the protesters and "obscure interests".

These "obscure interests" include the League for the Defence of the Environment (LIDEMA), which was set up with US government funds. Its backers include the US government aid agency, USAID, and the German-based Konrad Adenauer Foundation, which frequently funds actions against governments opposed by the United States and European governments such as Cuba.

Secret US diplomatic cables recently released by WikiLeaks and declassified US government files have conclusively shown that USAID directly targets indigenous communities in a bid to win them away from support for Morales and towards supporting US interests.

Behind these very real interests lies a campaign by rich nations and conservative environmental groups to promote policies that represent a new form of "green imperialism".

After centuries of plundering the resources of other countries, wiping out indigenous populations, and creating a dire global environmental crisis, the governments of rich nations now use environmental concerns to promote policies that deny underdeveloped nations the right to control and manage their own resources.

If they have their ways, these groups will reduce indigenous people to mere “park rangers”, paid by rich countries to protect limited areas, while multinational corporations destroy the environment elsewhere.

Bolivia’s indigenous majority has chosen a very different road. They aim to create a new state in which they are no longer marginalised or treated as minority groups that require special protection.

In alliance with other oppressed sectors, they aim to run their country for the collective benefit of the majority.

The Bolivian masses have successfully wrested government power from the traditional elites, won control over gas and other resources, and adopted a new constitution.

Mistakes have been made, and are likely in future. But they are the mistakes of a people of a small, landlocked and underdeveloped country fighting constant imperialist assaults.

Key to the Bolivian peoples’ fight is the world-wide front for climate justice, in which Bolivia is playing a vital leadership role.

One example was the 35,000-strong Peoples Summit on Climate Change organised by the Morales government in Cochabamba in April 2010.

The summit’s final declaration named developed countries as “the main cause of climate change". It insisted that those countries must "recognise and honor their climate debt", redirecting funds from war to aiding poorer nations to develop their economies "to produce goods and services necessary to satisfy the fundamental needs of their population".

To achieve this, the international climate justice movement must focus its efforts on forcing rich nations to accept their responsibilities.

The global movement must explicitly reject imperialist intervention in all its forms, including the “green imperialist” policies of US-funded NGOs.

Only through such a campaign can we support the efforts of poorer countries to chart a development path that respects the environment.

Unfortunately, Avaaz and the organisations that have signed the letter against Morales let the real culprits off the hook.

Their campaign should be rejected by all environmentalists and anti-imperialists fighting for a better a world.

[Federico Fuentes edits Bolivia-Rising.blogspot.com.]

Posted by Bolivia Rising on Sunday, September 25, 2011 10 comments

Labels: Debates, NGOs, TIPNIS

Bolivian president blasts the UN and the “Insecurity Council” on Libya

Bolivian president Evo Morales blasted United Nations and the Security Council for having approved military actions against Libya, an issue which he promised to consider when he addresses the General Assembly in New York.

Mercopress.com

“What Security Council are we talking about? I’d say it’s an Insecurity Council” said Morales in Havana, Cuba, arguing that the combined NATO attack and bombings on Libya “is a shameful action for humanity”.

The Bolivian president forecasted that once Muahmar Gaddfi has been removed from office by force, Western powers will dispute the control of Libya’s vast oil and gas resources, “which they have always ambitioned”.

“There is much interest in continuing to accumulate capital in a few hands, in the hands of the world’s oligarchy, of the big trans-national corporations”, said Morales.

The Bolivian president arrived in Havana over the weekend to meet Cuban President Raul Castro and Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez who is in Cuba for his fourth chemotherapy treatment.

President Morales will be honoured at the Havana University with the title of Doctor Honoris Causa in Political Science.

Morales from Havana travels to New York for the UN General Assembly where he anticipated “some reflections about the crisis of capitalism, and inhuman interventions such as the one practiced in Libya”.

Bolivia’s first indigenous president said developing nations such as Latin America should take advantage of the current capitalism crisis and cut dependency from the US and the European markets.

Before leaving Morales is expected to meet with the ailing fragile Fidel Castro, father of the Cuban revolution, who stepped down in 2006 and he considers an inspiring “sage old man”.

Bolivia together with the ALBA members (Bolivarian Alternative Alliance of the Americas) have strongly condemned the ousting of Gaddafi’s regime by a ‘gang’ of NATO ‘bullies’ and have refused to recognize the new Libyan authorities.

US, Nato and most multilateral organizations such as the IMF have officially recognized Libya’s National Transitional Council (NTC).

ALBA is the brainchild of Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez and includes, Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Ecuador and several English speaking Caribbean islands (highly dependent on Venezuelan oil)

Posted by Bolivia Rising on Thursday, September 22, 2011 0 comments

Labels: Libya, UN

Bolivia’s Morales asks bloc to condemn US on drugs

By: ANDREA RODRIGUEZ | 09/19/11
Associated Press

Bolivian President Evo Morales said Monday that a regional South American bloc should "decertify" the U.S. in its counternarcotics efforts, hitting back at Washington’s criticism of his South American nation on drugs.

Speaking in Cuba while receiving an honorary doctorate from the University of Havana, Morales accused the United States of being the root cause of the international drug trade as a leading consumer of cocaine.

"If the United States can certify or decertify, why can’t UNASUR (the Union of South American Nations) decertify the United States if the origin of drug trafficking is U.S. consumption of cocaine?" Morales said.

Washington first put Bolivia on its blacklist of nations that "failed demonstrably" to meet counterdrug obligations in 2008, and again renewed the designation last week. Venezuela and Burma are also on the list, which allows for possible sanctions, though President Barack Obama waived any penalties for Venezuela and Bolivia so the U.S. can support programs it says aim to help those nations’ people.

Nevertheless, the designation rankles in Bolivia, which is the world’s third largest producer of coca leaf, the base ingredient for cocaine. Bolivia’s government says it is doing everything it can to fight cocaine trafficking.

Morales, who is still the titular head of his country’s coca growers’ union, objects to the leaf’s classification as a controlled substance. He frequently extols its virtues in traditional uses such as brewed into a tea or chewed as a mild stimulant to ward off altitude sickness.

In 2006, he famously brandished a coca leaf during a speech to the U.N. General Assembly. Two years later he expelled U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration agents from Bolivia, accusing the DEA of inciting the autonomy-seeking opposition in eastern provinces.

"The drug trafficking (issue), just like terrorism, is fundamentally political," Morales said Monday. "Before, they accused leaders of being communists to persecute them, now its ‘drug trafficker’ or ‘terrorist.’"

Morales’ request to UNASUR is apparently symbolic in nature, as it’s not clear that any resolution issued by the bloc would have a practical impact on Washington.

___

Associated Press writer Peter Orsi contributed to this report.

http://boliviarising.blogspot.com/2011/09/bolivia-crisis-deepens-over-disputed.html

Bolivia: Amazon protest — development before environment?

September 9th, 011

By Federico Fuentes

The decision by leaders of the Sub Central of the Indigenous Territory and National Isiboro Secure Park (TIPNIS), to initiate a 500-kilometre protest march on Bolivia’s capital of La Paz capital has ignited much debate about the nature of Bolivia’s first indigenous led-government.

The Sub Central of TIPNIS unites the 64 indigenous communities within the park.

Much analysis has focused on the supposed hypocrisy of the government headed by Evo Morales, Bolivia’s first indigenous head of state. The Morales government has been criticised for pursuing pro-capitalist development and trampling on the rights of its own indigenous people.

Many analysts have also highlighted the contradiction between Morales’ public discourse in defence of indigenous rights and Mother Earth, and the proposal of his government’s to build a new highway that would run through this protected area of the Amazon.

According to Raul Prada, until recently a key figure in the Morales government and now ardent critic, the protests are forcing Morales to choose between “defence of life, of forests, of human beings and the vital cycles of the system of life or the path of narcotrafficking, of corrosive trade, extraction-based dependency, of the highways of dependency on emergent powers [a reference to Brazil ] and the empire”.

However, what the protests have actually revealed is the complicated reality of Bolivia’s social movements. It has shown the deep challenges they face in overcoming centuries of underdevelopment and internal fissures, which both threaten to undermine the process of change underway since Morales was first elected in 2005.

Exploitation

Attempts to counterpose the “developmentalist” policies of the government against the “communitarian” logic of the indigenous marchers fails to take into account the long running tensions that underpin the dispute.

For more than 500 years, Bolivia’s indigenous majority have seen their natural resources and wealth continuously pillaged by foreign powers (Spain, Britain and the United States).

The wealth ripped out from this small Andean nation helped fuel the growth of global metropolises such as London. But its local indigenous peoples were forced into a life of extreme poverty and oppression.

Despite sitting upon the second largest gas reserves in South America, and at one time supplying almost 50% of the world’s tin, Bolivia is general considered the second poorest country in the Americas.

The disaster created by imperialist domination not only impact on the livelihoods of ordinary Bolivians. Through the super-exploitation of its wealth, Bolivia’s economy was subsumed into the world market in a subordinate position.

Its economy revolved around the interests of foreign capital rather than the needs of its people.

To ensure this subordination, the Bolivian state was dominated by foreign interests. The local white oligarchy was entrusted with running it.

The state was successful in putting down numerous internal revolts. But it was ineffectual in asserting any real sovereignty over Bolivia and integrating its far flung regions into a dynamic national economy.

One consequence of this was that since independence, Bolivia has lost more than half of its national territories to neighbouring countries.

This included losing its access to the Pacific Ocean to Chile in the 1879-1883 Pacific War. This has cost Bolivia more than US$30 billion since 1970.

Rolling ‘social revolution’

The onset of neoliberalism in the 1980s worsened the situation. It fuelled what one US embassy cable recently released by WikiLeaks called “the country’s rolling ‘social revolution’”.

The cable, dated May 17, 2006, noted that US-imposed neoliberalism led to increased poverty, unemployment, and rural migration towards underdeveloped cities. This left “new urban dwellers clamouring for access to basic services”.

Worsening poverty levels, the cable said, had a “clear rural-urban, a growing regional, and a distinctly racial dimension”.

The cable also noted “growing ethnic consciousness has fed ‘indigenous’ resentment of the dominant ‘white’ minority and the political system that allegedly sustained it”.

“In combination, these factors have undermined the faith of many Bolivians in the old economic and political order”. It said this led to increased support for the Morales government, whose largest support base came from those identified in the US cable as most affected by neoliberalism.

This was the basis for Morales’ election and the displacement of Bolivia’s white elites from their traditional positions of power in the state.

In particular, Morales support base is among the indigenous majority, dividing into 36 peoples that live in the highlands to the west and lowlands to the east.

The two, larger indigenous peoples are the Quechas (2.5 million people) and Aymaras (2 million people). Bolivia’s total population is close to 10 million.

These two peoples have predominately been based in the west.

But the process of internal migration by Aymaras and Quechas indigenous campesinos seeking land in the east (commonly referred to as “colonisers”), has steady increased their numbers in the lowland.

It has also contributed to nearly doubling the size of the city of Santa Cruz in the east over the past 20 years. It is now home to 1.2 million, making it the largest city in Bolivia.

At the same time, rural-urban migration has fuelled the growth of the mostly indigenous city of El Alto, on the outskirts of La Paz.

Its population skyrocketed from around 400,000 in 1992 to current estimates of more than a million.

This overwhelming indigenous city, key to the successive overthrow of two neoliberal presidents, is another heartland of Morales support.

Morales, himself an Aymara, grew up in the altiplano (highlands)> He later moved to the largely Quechua coca-growing region of the Chapare, nestled in the centre of the country.

In the mid-’90s, the Chapare became a battleground of the US “war on drugs”. The cocalero (coca-growers) movement, head by Morales, was the backbone of a rising anti-imperialist movement.

Together with predominately Aymara and Quecha campesinos who made up the country’s largest rural-based organisations — the Sole Union Confederation of Bolivian Campesino Workers of Bolivia (CSUTCB), the Union Confederation of Bolivian Colonisers (CSCB), and the National Federation of Bolivian Campesino Women “Bartolina Sisa (FNMCB-BS) — the cocaleros formed what today is commonly known as the Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) in the mid-’90s.

It is important to note that as a result of the land reform carried out by Bolivia’s 1952 National Revolution, most of the indigenous peoples in the west were granted access to small land plots (via private deeds).

The traditional union model of organising was imposed upon their traditional communitarian organisation.

This further fractured the communitarian bonds that had already begun to be undermined by centuries of colonialisation.

The result, however, was a certain fusion of elements of both within these organisations.

In the east, where the indigenous population was smaller, land reform was never implemented.

Instead, the east, centred around Santa Cruz, gradually became the new economic motor of Bolivia. This was due to its huge gas deposits and the rise of powerful latifundistas<.em> (large landowners).

This part of Bolivia is home to the Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of the East (CIDOB), which unites organisations from 34 of the 36 groups of indigenous peoples. It represents about 500,000 people.

CIDOB and the National Council of Ayllus and Markas of Qullasuyu (CONAMAQ), which unites some indigenous communities in the altiplano, took part in the founding meetings of the MAS.

But the two groups never became organic components of this “political instrument”.

Instead, relationships were maintained between these organisations in two ways. First, the different campesino and indigenous groups came together to form the Unity Pact. And second, various CONAMAQ and CIDOB leaders, such as its current president Adolfo Chavez, were elected as MAS parliamentarians.

Conflicts

At the same time, conflicts between these groups have emerged at different times.

At the root of some of these divergences have been the differing visions between the lowland indigenous movements, with their strong ties to NGOs and the church and their focus on the environment and indigenous control over territory and natural resources, and those of the highland campesino movements.

The highland groups political and anti-imperialist outlook was heavily influenced by the 1952 National Revolution and the 1980s mass emmigration of mine workers into the countryside in search of work.

These differences have played out in TIPNIS over the past decades, especially since “colonisers” from the west began settling in the area as of the ’70s and ’80s.

After a historic march by the indigenous peoples of the east in 1990, then president Jamie Paz Zamora declared the 1.2 million hectares that comprise TIPNIS an ancestral territory of the Mojeno, Yuracare and Chiman peoples.

However, this move was unable to put an end to the constant disputes between local indigenous communities and indigenous “colonisers” who have moved in to occupy land for agriculture.

This led to a state of semi-permanent confrontations.

The conflict only subsided after a demarcation agreement was signed in 1992 between Marcial Fabricano, then head of the Sub Central of TIPNIS, and Morales, as head of the cocalero federation that includes the “colonisers” in the southern part of TIPNIS.

The agreement gave existing colonisers the right to land currently occupied while halting further invasions.

These differences were also reflected in the roles played by the various organisations during the period of social rebellion that began in 2000.

US interference

As the uprising against neoliberalism grew in strength, overthrowing a neoliberal president in 2003, US imperialism sought to use money to increase divisions within the indigenous movements.

In late 2005, investigative journalist Reed Lindsay published an article in NACLA that used declassified US documents to expose how US government-funded agency USAID was used to this effect.

USAID was already planning by 2002 to “help build moderate, pro-democracy political parties that can serve as a counterweight to the radical MAS or its successors”.

The downfall in 2003 of president Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada triggered a step-up in this subversive activity.

A particular target was CIDOB.

The group was in a crisis after Fabricano was accused of profiting from illegal logging and he accepted the post of vice-minister of Indigenous Affairs under Sanchez de Lozada.

Through USAID funding to the Brecha Foundation, an NGO established by CIDOB leaders, the US hoped to further mould the organisation to its own ends.

Referring to comments made by Brecha director Victor Hugo Vela, Lindsay notes that during this time, “CIDOB leaders allied with Fabricano have condemned the cultivation of coca, helped the business elite in the department of Santa Cruz to push for region autonomy and opposed a proposal to require petroleum companies to consult with indigenous communities before drilling on their lands”.

The CSUTCB (divided between followers of Morales and radical Aymara leader Felipe Quispe), CSCB, FNMCB-BS and organisations such as the neighbourhood councils of El Alto (Fejuve), and to a less extent worker and miner organisations, were at the forefront of constant street battles and insurrections.

CIDOB, however, took an approach marked by negotiation and moderation.

It was not until July 2005 that CIDOB renewed its leadership, in turn breaking relations with Brecha.

CIDOB was not the only target for infiltration.

With close to $200,000 in US government funds, the Land and Liberty Movement (MTL) was set up in 2004 by Walter Reynaga.

As well as splitting the Movement of Landless Peasant’s (MST), one wing of which operated out of his La Paz office, Lindsay said Reynaga, like Vega, tried to win control of the “MAS-aligned” CONAMAQ.

All these groups came behind the campaign to elect Morales in 2005.

Gains

Since then, the Morales government has taken important steps towards breaking Bolivia’s dependency on foreign capital. His government has nationalised Bolivia’s gas reserves and refused to follow International Monetary Fund-diktats.

The government has also moved quickly to tackle the urgent and deeply felt needs of its base.

Data collated by the Unit of Analysis of Social and Economic Policies (UDAPE), a government think tank from the National Institute of Statistics (INE), show just how much progress has been made.

Poverty levels have fallen from 60.6% in 2005 to 49.6% in 2010.

The biggest drop came in rural areas (77.6% to 65.1%). Extreme poverty also fell from 38.2% in 2005 to 25.4% in 2010.

In 2005, the wealthiest 10% received 128 times the amount of income than the poorest 10%. By 2009, this had been reduced to 60 times.

Recent figures from the IMF back these findings and indicate that 1.1 million Bolivians were lifted out of extreme poverty between 2007 and 2009.

Along with tackling poverty, another priority of the first Morales administration (2006-2009) was focusing on the needs of indigenous communities in the lowlands.

This was seen as essential in nurturing social movements that could help counteract the attempts by the right-wing opposition, centred in the east, to overthrow his government.

In regards to TIPNIS, Morales directly intervened in 2006 to expel colonisers who had occupied further lands in the TIPNIS. Many of them were associated with the cocalero federation he still headed despite becoming head of state.

In 2009, the 64 indigenous communities of the TIPNIS, about 12,000 people all up, were finally handed over the title to over 1 million hectares of land. The remaining 200,000 hectares went predominately to the roughly 100,000 colonisers present in the south of the park.

Former vice-minister of land Alejandro Almaraz, who together with Prada is a key spokesperson of a group of former government members turned dissidents, explained in a July 29 interview posted by Rebelion that of the 25 million hectares of land redistributed under Morales until the end of 2010, 16 million was handed over as communitarian lands belonging to original indigenous owners.

In comparison, the campesino sector received less than 3 million hectares in the form of individual or family titles.

Crucially, the unity forged between indigenous peoples of the east and west, and urban and rural areas, was critical to defeating the September 2008 coup attempt by the right-wing opposition sectors in the east.

It was also vital to Morales record re-election vote of 64% in the December 2009 elections.

‘Industrial leap forward’

A big part of Morales’ election campaign was his promised “industrial leap forward”.

Speaking to supporters in El Alto at his campaign closing rally, Morales emphasised industrialisation, the physical integration of the country and social inclusion as key goals of his second government.

The MAS’s election program included a section entitled “roadway revolution for an integrated country”.

This focused on the need to expand and build key highways that could integrate isolated regions, and help promote economic development at the local and national.

Among the proposed roadways was one that would link the northern department of Beni with Cochabamba.

Some have criticised this highway. They point to the fact it is part of the Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America, a Brazilian-led project to economically integrate the continent, as proof of Bolivia’s subordination of Brazilian “sub-imperialism”.

Brazil is footing 80% of the bill for the disputed highway.

Others have noted that the highway is critical to breaking the department of Beni’s dependency on Santa Cruz.

At the moment, all agricultural products must go via Santa Cruz to the east before being able to be transported westward.

The proposed highway would directly connect Beni to Cochabamba. This would reduce costs for agricultural producers (and consumers) and travel distance from 848 kilometres to 306 kilometres.

Given Beni’s status as the largest meat producing department, this would break the hold that Santa Cruz-based slaughterhouses have on imposing meat prices.

This is one of the reasons why important sections of the Santa Cruz elite are opposing the highway.

Also, criticisms of subordination to Brazilian interests have not been made in regards to the many other roadways being funded by Brazil as part of IIRSA. These are strongly supported by the communities that will benefit from greater access to transportation and basic services.

In fact, on August 15, the same day marchers from TIPNIS headed off to La Paz, two other protests were held in the important MAS strongholds of El Alto and Potosi.

These protests included in their demands access to basic services, and the building of more factories and highways. Neither protest raised opposition to the proposed highway through TIPNIS.

In many ways, these protests reflect the increased tensions the MAS government has faced since defeating the right-wing coup attempt and winning re-election.

Various sections of its base, feeling their time has come, are now protesting to demand the government turn its attention towards them.

In all these cases, the demands have been for more, not less development.

In some cases, this has led to increased conflicts within the different social movements. This is reflected by the divisions within the Unity Pact over the push by campesino organisations to redirect government attention towards this sector in its land reform program.

Highway dispute

This is also true in regards to TIPNIS. The various indigenous and campesino movements that are part of it are far from united in their opposition to the roadway.

The main campesino groups (comprised overwhelmingly of indigenous peoples), and leaders from the Bolivian Workers Central (COB), have declared their support for an eventual highway, while maintaining that any final plan take into consideration the needs of local indigenous communities.

Important indigenous organisations have also stated similar positions.

Despite the presence of CONAMAQ leaders such as Rafael Quispe in the march against the roadway, its affiliate organisations from La Paz and Potosi have rejected opposition to it.

The Indigenous Council of Communities of the South (CONISUR), which groups indigenous communities in the south of TIPNIS as well as colonisers that inhabit those areas have come out in support of an eventual roadway.

The Yuracare Indigenous Council, that unites the Yucare, Mojeno and Trinitario peoples, has as well.

All these groups have highlighted the benefits the highway will bring in regards to access to basic services, ability to sell products and travel.

Attempts have been made to equate these organisation’s positions with their vested interests in accumulating land.

This is in line with recent moves by the CSUTCB to shift the government’s land reform policy away from prioritising collective indigenous titles towards providing individual or family titles to its traditional base.

There are elements of truth (and much exaggeration) to this claim, but this should come as no surprise.

The same CSUTCB, and other campesino organisations which led the protests between 2000 and 2005, have always defended this position. This is shown by the history of conflict in TIPNIS.

Demands

And it is also true that the demands of the Sub Central of TIPNIS, and in particular CIDOB, are far removed from any notion of communitarianism.

Although initially focused on opposition to the highway, protesters presented the government with an original list of 13 demands, then extended to 16, on the day the march began.

Among those were calls for indigenous peoples to be able to directly receive compensation payment for offsetting carbon emissions.

This policy, know as REDD+, has been denounced as the privatisation of the forests by many environmental activists and the Peoples’ Summit of Climate Change organised in Bolivia in 2010.

It has also been promoted as a mechanism to allow developed countries to continue to pollute while undermining the right underdeveloped to develop their economies.

Another demand calls for the replacement of functionaries within the Authority for Control and Monitoring of Forests and Lands (ABT).

This demand dovetails with the allegations made by Morales against CIDOB leaders, and never refuted, that they want to control this state institution.

Much focus has been made of the potential environmental destruction caused by a highway that would open the path to future “coloniser” settlements.

But these arguments have only focused on one side of the equation.

Much has been made of a study by Bolivian Strategic Research Program that concluded that 64.5% of TIPNIS would be lost to deforestation by 2030 as a result of the highway.

Few, though, have noted that the same study found that even without the highway 43% of TIPNIS would be lost if the current rate of deforestation continues.

The biggest cause of this is the illegal logging that continues to occur, in some cases with the complicity of some local indigenous leaders and communities.

An environmental impact studies by the Bolivian Highway Authority have found the direct impact of the highway on TIPNIS to be 0.03%.

But this has to weighed up with the fact that the highway would provide the state with access to areas currently out of its reach.

This would enable not only access to services, but a greater ability to tackle illegal logging and potential narcotrafficking in the area.

At the same time, the government has asked the indigenous communities of TIPNIS to help in drafting legislation that would impose jail terms of 10 to 20 years on those found to be illegally settling, growing coca or logging in TIPNIS.

Meeting the needs of the majority

What becomes clear is that far from some polarised debate between "indigenous communitarianism" and the government’s savage “developmentalism”, there is more in common than there is differences between both sides of the debate.

One the one hand, there is the progressive sentiment of wanting to defend cultures and access basic services. On the other, a scramble for control over resources (land, forests, gas).

In this context of competing interests, the Morales government has made clear its intention to construct a highway in the region.

This has included the option of having the highway go around TIPNIS if this is economically and environmentally feasible — although no such alternative has yet been proposed by the protesters.

In doing so, its decision (right or wrong) has been based on prioritising what it sees as the basic needs of the majority, which if not met risks losing support for the government.

At the same time, it has predicating any final route (of which at the moment there are eight options) on a process of consultation with all communities affected.

This stress on dialogue and willingness to consult all those involved has being a running theme in the government’s approach.

In the place of repression (as would have occurred under pre-Morales governments) police have provide protection.

Also, 20 high-level government ministers, vice-ministers and presidents of state institutions have travelled to the remote areas to listen to community leaders in meetings open to all march participants.

One complication that has come relates to the issue of who gets to be consulted. The marchers have ruled out the right of the colonisers, and even some indigenous organisations, to take part.

March leaders also subsequently rejected outright the government’s proposal to carry out a consultation of the 64 indigenous communities within TIPNIS.

A further complication has been the increasingly hostile nature of the debate.

From the government’s side, it has strongly denounced the role of NGOs, USAID and opposition forces from Santa Cruz in fomenting the protests, as evidenced by their offers to provide financial support to the marchers.

Some have noted that opposition forces would like to see sections of the indigenous movement come out opposing the elections of judiciary authorities scheduled for October.

This is a far-reaching measure, which would transform a traditional corrupt judiciary dominated by the old right-wing parties into a popularly elected institution.

It would no doubt lead to indigenous people occupying posts they were previously barred from.

This makes it obvious why such forces are seeking to undermine the vote.

Some CIDOB and CONAMAQ leaders, and the group led by Prada and Almaraz, have come out against the election of the judicial power.

Dangerous positions

It is dangerous to deny, or downplay, the presence of forces such as USAID, NGOs and anti-Morales parties in this dispute — fishing around to win support among disgruntled sectors of Morales bases.

Only the most naive could imagine this was not the case, particularly as there is ample evidence to back up such claims.

However, just as dangerous is the actions of the government that have created an atmosphere were mutual denunciations and accusations take precedence over the much more necessary debate regarding Bolivia’s future.

This has been made worse by the sexist remarks of Morales himself, who called on the “colonisers” to “seduce the Yuracare and Trinitaria women, so that they don’t oppose the road”.

The same is also true of attempts by critics to portray support for the highway as somehow equivalent with support for “narcotrafficking”.

This is a common attack made by the US against the Morales government, and before that the cocalero movement.

On the surface, the issue of TIPNIS revolves around whether the economic interests of uniting Beni and Cochabamba, and the benefits it will bring regarding access to services and ability to sell agricultural products, override those of the local indigenous communities and their ancestral lands, or whether a comprise can be found that takes both factors into account.

But behind this specific issue lies a deeper debate of how Bolivia can promote an economic system that can navigate through the difficulties of overcoming centuries of underdevelopment while respecting Mother Earth.

Such a debate is essential. The current situation provides an opportunity for all involved to open a path in that direction.

This debate can, and should, entail protests such as those occurring now. These could aid in tackling some of the tradition developmentalist mentality prevalent within sections of the government.

But to be successful, this will require going beyond fragmented organisations mobilised behind individual or sectional interests. It will require a movement united behind a radical program for change.

Otherwise the risk is that such fissures within the movement for change become openings for a return to the right.

[Federico Fuentes edits www.boliviarising.blogspot.com]

http://boliviarising.blogspot.com/2011/09/bolivia-amazon-protest-development.html